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Emotionsa b s t r a c t
Delusions are deﬁned as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in
the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological beneﬁts.
One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low
self-esteem by allowing motivational inﬂuences on belief formation. In this paper I focus
on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions)
and argue that some of their psychological beneﬁts can convert into epistemic ones.
Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, motivated delusions also have potential epistemic
beneﬁts for agents who have faced adversities, undergone physical or psychological
trauma, or are subject to negative emotions and low self-esteem. To account for the episte-
mic status of motivated delusions, costly and beneﬁcial at the same time, I introduce the
notion of epistemic innocence. A delusion is epistemically innocent when adopting it
delivers a signiﬁcant epistemic beneﬁt, and the beneﬁt could not be attained if the delusion
were not adopted. The analysis leads to a novel account of the status of delusions by
inviting a reﬂection on the relationship between psychological and epistemic beneﬁts.
 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).0. Introduction
In this paper, I ask whether delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function have epistemic beneﬁts.
Defence mechanisms are ‘‘a means of nuancing or processing information such that it is rendered less anxiety-provoking’’
(McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005, p. 316). Arguably, delusions can prevent loss of self-esteem and help manage strong
negative emotions (Butler, 2000; Ramachandran, 1996; Raskin and Sullivan, 1974; Bentall, 1994). The claim that delusions
are psychologically adaptive can be made on these grounds, and it was recently discussed in the psychological literature
(McKay & Dennett, 2009; McKay & Kinsbourne, 2010; McKay et al., 2005). Without denying that delusions are typically false
and irrational, and that they compromise good functioning to a considerable extent, my goal here is to establish whether the
psychological beneﬁts attributed to those delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function can translate
into epistemic beneﬁts. Thinking about delusions in terms of potential epistemic beneﬁts leads to a more balanced view of
the role of delusions in a person’s cognitive and affective life and invites a reﬂection on the relevance of contextual factors in
epistemic evaluation.
In Section 1, I review the general features of delusions and describe the epistemic features of delusions that can be
construed as playing a defensive function (hereafter,motivated delusions) and their adverse effects on functioning. In Section
2, I consider arguments for the psychological beneﬁts of Reverse Othello syndrome, erotomania and anosognosia. I also
describe the proposal by McKay and Dennett (2009), according to which some false beliefs (adaptive misbeliefs) are the result
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misbeliefs? In Section 3, I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent when, despite
their epistemic costs, they carry a signiﬁcant epistemic beneﬁt (Epistemic Beneﬁt condition) that could not be attained
otherwise (No Alternatives condition). I argue that motivated delusions have the potential for satisfying the two conditions
for epistemic innocence and I offer an illustration from anosognosia to support this claim. In Section 4, I suggest that the
epistemic innocence potential of motivated delusions highlights the need for a more nuanced evaluation of epistemically
costly cognitions and invites a new way of understanding the relationship between psychological and epistemic beneﬁts.
1. Motivated delusions
Clinical delusions are symptoms of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, dementia, and delusional disorders.
Delusions exemplify failures of rationality and are deﬁned on the basis of surface features that have an epistemic character.
Here are some popular deﬁnitions:
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is ﬁrmly held despite what almost everyone else
believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not
ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (i.e., it is not an article of religious faith).
When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as
to defy credibility.
[American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5, 2013, p. 819]
A person is deluded when they have come to hold a particular belief with a degree of ﬁrmness that is both utterly unwar-
ranted by the evidence at hand, and that jeopardises their day-to-day functioning.
[McKay et al., 2005, p. 315]
Delusions are generally accepted to be beliefs which (a) are held with great conviction; (b) defy rational counter-
argument; (c) and would be dismissed as false or bizarre by members of the same socio-cultural group.
[Gilleen & David, 2005, pp. 5–6]
The deﬁnitions above characterise delusions on the basis of their epistemic features, including lack of warrant, ﬁxity,
resistance to counterargument, and implausibility. Not all delusions manifest such features to the same extent, and delusions
may differ in the way they interact with the person’s other cognitive or affective states.
1.1. Types of delusions
Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, and Breen (2001) helpfully distinguish between circumscribed and elaborated delusions.
Circumscribed delusions are not well integrated with the other beliefs the person has, and the epistemic features that
characterise these delusions do not necessarily ‘‘spread’’ to the rest of the person’s belief system. Some of these delusions,
so-called ‘‘deﬁcit’’ delusions (McKay & Dennett, 2009), are the result of brain damage or cognitive deterioration, and, even if
they were given a psychodynamic interpretation in the past, there is now little room for motivational factors in an account of
their formation. Examples are the Capgras delusion (the belief that a loved one has been replaced by an impostor) and
mirrored-self misidentiﬁcation (the belief that there is a stranger in the mirror when one looks at one’s own reﬂection).
Other circumscribed delusions have been construed as playing a defensive function, and motivational factors are sometimes
advocated in the explanation of their formation. Such delusions often follow trauma. Examples are the Reverse Othello
syndrome (the belief that one’s romantic partner is faithful when she is not) and anosognosia (the denial of illness, for
instance the denial that one’s limb is paralysed).
Delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia can be systematised and elaborated. They can turn into complex
narratives used to explain most of the person’s experience. Examples are the delusion of persecution (the belief that others
are threatening and intend to cause harm), the delusion of grandeur (the exaggerated belief in one’s self-worth), and the
delusion of reference (the belief that some events are highly signiﬁcant when they are not). A popular hypothesis is that
delusions in schizophrenia are offered as an explanation for the person’s hypersalient experience. Given that hypersalient
experiences cause anxiety and distress in the prodromal phase of psychosis, delusions emerge as hypotheses by which
the person makes sense of their experiences (Jaspers, 1963; Kapur, 2003; Mishara and Corlett, 2009). Delusions in schizo-
phrenia can put an end to a state of uncertainty that causes anxiety and distress. Sometimes the ‘‘need for closure’’ is
discussed in this context (McKay & Kinsbourne, 2010) and it indicates a preference for certainty over uncertainty and for
predictability over unpredictability. In addition to satisfying the need to have an explanation as opposed to none, it has been
argued that some delusions in schizophrenia can be motivated due to their speciﬁc content. Among others, delusions of
grandeur and delusions of persecution seem to protect the person from a negative conception of the self and from low
self-esteem.
In terms of aetiology, it is plausible that a combination of neurobiological and psycho-social factors (including
motivational factors) contribute to the formation of delusions (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Davies, 2009; McKay
& Kinsbourne, 2010; Roberts, 1992). For instance, Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) argue that a two-factor theory of delusion
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factor explains why the delusion is not rejected. The ﬁrst factor usually consists in an anomalous experience or a neuropsy-
chological deﬁcit. The second factor consists in an impairment of belief evaluation, that is, a problem with the assessment of
the evidence for and against the delusional belief. Such a problem may be caused by cognitive impairments, but may also be
caused by a motivationally-biased handling of the evidence. When no anomalous experience or deﬁcit can be identiﬁed, it is
possible that motivation constitutes the ﬁrst factor, in which case the delusion would emerge as a defence mechanism
(McKay et al., 2005).
Here I do not propose to discuss the role of motivation in delusion formation, rather I am interested in evidence for the
claim that delusions have psychological beneﬁts, and such evidence is often reviewed in the discussion of different delusion
formation theories. For convenience and due to space limitations, I will concentrate on those delusions that have been explic-
itly construed as defence mechanisms in the psychological literature, but I make no assumption about such accounts being
the best explanations of how the delusions are formed. For some of the delusions I shall describe, it is possible that a defence
mechanism explains the origin of the delusion and its content. For all of these delusions, it is plausible that motivational
factors play some role in the maintenance of the delusions. But motivational factors need not play any role in delusion
formation for delusions to have psychological beneﬁts.
1.2. What is wrong with motivated delusions?
Let me describe some of the characteristics of motivated delusions that amount to epistemic costs and can also lead to
impaired functioning. Motivated delusions can be characterised as irrational beliefs, in that they are implausible, they do
not accurately represent reality, they do not respond to evidence, and they may not always be consistently reﬂected in
behaviour (Bortolotti, 2009). For instance, people with motivated delusions may be convinced of the truth of the delusion
but at the same time exhibit some ‘‘covert recognition’’ that the content of the delusion is false. When they are circum-
scribed, motivated delusions may conﬂict with other beliefs the person has, contributing to an overall inconsistent set of
beliefs. When they are elaborated and systematised, they are likely to integrate well with a number of other beliefs that also
play a defensive function. I will consider three cases of motivated delusions.
An example of a monothematic delusion with a defensive function that emerged as a result of brain damage is the case of
Reverse Othello syndrome (Butler, 2000) discussed in some detail by McKay et al. (2005). A man, BX, delusionally believed
that he was in a happy relationship, when in fact his partner had left him.
Butler’s patient was a talented musician who had sustained severe head injuries in a car accident. The accident left him
quadriplegic, unable to speak without reliance on an electronic communicator. One year after his injury, the patient
developed a delusional system that revolved around the continuing ﬁdelity of his partner (who had in fact severed all
contact with him soon after his accident). The patient became convinced that he and his former partner had recently
married, and he was eager to persuade others that he now felt sexually fulﬁlled.
[McKay et al., 2005, p. 313]
BX’s belief in the ﬁdelity of his previous partner and the continued success of his relationship was very resistant to coun-
terevidence. BX believed that his relationship was going from strength to strength for a few months, even though his former
partner did not want to communicate with him and was in a relationship with someone else (Butler, 2000, p. 86).
The Reverse Othello syndrome can be seen as a special case of erotomania. In erotomania, a person comes to believe that
another person, often of a perceived higher status (e.g., a teacher, an older or more successful person, a celebrity), is in love
with her when there is no evidence in support of that belief. Here is the case of a young woman, LT, who started behaving
strangely when she became obsessed with the idea that a fellow student was in love with her although the two had never
spoken to each other.
Her conversation, when unrelated to her delusional process, was rational, coherent, appropriate, and relevant. [. . .] When
speaking of the delusional process, she went into great detail, explaining the messages she received from her fantasied
lover, signs which she received on TV, from the colors of dresses, license plates on cars, and from several other sources.
She saw all of this as proof of the fact that the young man was in love with her and was planning to marry her.
[Jordan & Howe, 1980, p. 983]
Numerous attempts to offer LT evidence that her belief was false failed: after two and a half years after the delusion
emerged, the alleged lover was asked to talk to LT on the phone, following a suggestion by LT’s mother. He told LT that
he did not have any intention to marry her and that he could barely remember who she was. But LT was convinced that
her mother had arranged for her to talk to another man and did not abandon her delusion.
Motivated delusions are also found in the context of anosognosia, the denial of illness (most commonly, the denial that a
limb is paralysed). Delusions take the form of: ‘‘I ammoving my arm’’, when the arm cannot move; or ‘‘I can climb stairs but I
am a little slow’’ when a leg is paralysed. Anosognosia has been considered as a pathology of belief: ‘‘There is a mismatch
between the patient’s estimate of his or her abilities and the reality of the impairment’’ (Aimola Davies, Davies, Ogden,
Smithson, & White, 2009, p. 188). In anosognosia, people deny evidence supporting the fact that they are impaired. Here
is the case of a patient with anosognosia for hemiplegia:
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midline, moving it as if it was clapped against the left hand. She appeared perfectly satisﬁed with her performance, never
admitting that the left arm did not participate in the action. This despite the fact that the patient could see that the left
hand did not clap against the right hand and the typical sound of clapping was not heard.
[Berti, Spinazzola, Pia, & Rabuffetti, 1993, p. 164]
It is not clear to what extent people with anosognosia are unaware of their impairment, given that, on occasion, they seem
to implicitly acknowledge it. For instance, a person with a paralysed leg might deny paralysis but at the same time acknowl-
edge that she cannot climb stairs properly. She might even provide a confabulatory explanation of her poor performance,
saying that it is due to tiredness or to arthritis (Ramachandran, 1995, p. 23).
The delusions I have described are not just implausible and irresponsive to evidence but they have an adverse effect on
wellbeing and interfere with interpersonal relationships. The person reporting the delusion stops being regarded as a trust-
worthy source of information about the topic of the delusion and may be socially sanctioned or excluded for that reason.
Relationships with family members and with healthcare professionals may be strained as a result of the absence of a ‘‘shared
reality’’ (Fotopoulou, 2008, p. 546) and common goals.
In many cases of erotomania (Lovett-Doust & Christie, 1978), the person develops an obsession with the delusional
theme, loses interest in her family and friends, gives up her daily activities, and becomes isolated as a result. Anosognosia
can have negative effects on people’s health. For instance, it can interfere with therapy and rehabilitation (Fotopoulou,
2008, p. 554). If the person does not acknowledge an impairment due to a recent trauma, she will not understand the need
to engage in rehabilitation; indeed it has been found that anosognosia is ‘‘an inhibitory factor hampering rehabilitation’’
(Maeshima et al., 1997, p. 691).
2. Delusion as psychologically adaptive
Considerations about the epistemic costs of delusions and their adverse effects on functioning seem to rule out the
possibility that delusions have any beneﬁts. However, it has been argued that the adoption of a motivated delusion helps
manage overwhelmingly negative emotions that would otherwise lead to depression and protects against negative self-
conceptions that would otherwise lead to low self-esteem. In the light of these arguments, the relationship between
delusions and wellbeing appears more complex than one might have expected. For instance, Lansky (1977, p. 21) writes that
delusion ‘‘is restitutive, ameliorating anxieties by altering the construction of reality’’.
2.1. Motivated delusions in context
In the case of Reverse Othello syndrome I mentioned earlier, the delusion seemed to protect BX from the undesirable
truth that his romantic partner had left him while he was coping with the consequences of permanent disability. Butler,
who ﬁrst reported on this case, describes the period preceding the report of the delusion:
[H]is communicative responses initially indicated considerable insight and the beginning of an intense emotional
response to a massive disability and a fracturing of his interpersonal relationships.
[Butler, 2000, p. 87]
Gradually, in the year following his injury, BX developed the delusion that his former romantic partner was still in a
successful relationship with him, and also that they had recently married. While still in hospital, he often asked to go home
so that he could see his wife. Butler argues that the delusion relieved the sense of loss that BX was feeling at the time.
[A]ppearance [of delusions] may mark an adaptive attempt to regain intrapsychic coherence and to confer meaning on
otherwise catastrophic loss or emptiness.
[Butler, 2000, p. 90]
As gradually as it had appeared, BX’s delusional system dissolved, and by the end of the process BX realised that his
former partner had moved on, was not married to him, and had no intention to go back to him. No other delusions or
psychotic symptoms were observed. This happened roughly at the time when BX had completed his physical rehabilitation
and was ready to return home.
Butler does not advocate a purely motivational explanation for BX’s delusion, but simply argues that different factors
might have been at play, and that a psychological defence against depression contributed to the ﬁxity and elaboration of
BX’s delusional system. Independent of the role of motivational factors in the formation or maintenance of delusions, Butler
makes a case for the presence of psychological beneﬁts. The delusion kept BX’s depression at bay at a very critical time.
Acknowledging the end of his romantic relationship might have been disastrous at a time when he was coping with the
realisation of his new disability and its effects on his life.
Erotomania more generally has also been described as an adaptive response (Raskin & Sullivan, 1974)), and it is
signiﬁcant that it often develops following a physical/psychological trauma or adverse circumstances. In many of the case
studies of erotomania reported in the literature, the delusion seems to affect people who have a history of depression
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nia and whose case was reported by Jordan and Howe (1980). Her background ﬁts with the general proﬁle described:
The patient has a twin sister, who at that time was a junior in college, and a younger sister, who was two years old at the
time of the onset of this disorder. In describing L.T.’s twin sister, Mrs. T. indicated that she was outgoing, friendly, and
though somewhat reserved, maintained close relationships with people of both sexes. The mother stated that the patient
in contrast had always been a quiet and rather inhibited child. She was much more reserved than her popular sister and
dated infrequently. She was also described as being studious, an avid reader, highly moralistic, and a loner. Moreover, she
tended to be somewhat suspicious and mistrustful. Her limited heterosexual experiences were characterized as being
very short-lived. According to the mother, one such relationship had just recently ended abruptly and she related that
the patient appeared rather emotionally distraught by this.
[Jordan & Howe, 1980, pp. 982–3]
In many cases of erotomania (Lovett-Doust & Christie, 1978, p. 105), there are identiﬁable ‘‘pharmacological, metabolic,
and physiological and structural causes’’ (including injection of cortisone, alcoholism, meningioma, ingestion of contracep-
tive pills), but also ‘‘psychological and situational triggers’’. People experience loneliness and loss prior to adopting the delu-
sion, and in some cases the emergence of the delusion follows a traumatic event (e.g., the discovery of one’s partner’s
inﬁdelity, the death of a loved one, or the birth of a child then given up for adoption). This seems to suggest that the delusion
plays a defensive function in that it compensates for loss or protects one from low self-esteem.
In anosognosia, the connection between trauma and delusion is more explicit. The person refuses to acknowledge a seri-
ous impairment as a result of trauma or illness and, also often fails to recognise its implications (although the denial of the
impairment and the failure to acknowledge its implications can dissociate, see Aimola Davies et al., 2009). Delusions occur-
ring in anosognosia can be seen as playing a defensive function, but purely motivational accounts of anosognosia have been
strongly criticised for failing to account for the fact that anosognosia is much more likely to emerge when the right parietal
lobe is damaged, and that the denial seems to be ‘‘domain-speciﬁc’’: the person may deny one impairment and acknowledge
another. Ramachandran describes a patient who would go to great lengths to deny the paralysis of her limb but happily
admitted to having diabetes (Ramachandran, 1995, pp. 23–24).
To explain these phenomena, popular accounts of anosognosia have attempted to combine neuropsychological and
motivational factors (Aimola Davies et al., 2009; Ramachandran, 1996). Ramachandran advances the hypothesis that the
behaviours that give rise to delusions in this context are an exaggeration of normal defence mechanisms that have an adap-
tive function. Denying change can sometimes be instrumental to preserving a coherent system of beliefs and behaving in a
stable and predictable manner (Ramachandran, 1996). The psychological advantages are not necessarily cashed out in terms
of the preservation of the concept of the self as healthy, but in terms of the preservation of the concept of the present self as
coherent with that of the past self. Fotopoulou observes the same phenomenon in people with memory impairments and
anosognosia who do not seem to update personal information:
[P]atients may need to highlight their continuity and coherence with their past selves and may not be able to understand
or deal with the loss of their previous family and social role.
[Fotopoulou, 2008, p. 560]
Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) report positive and negative effects of anosognosia on wellbeing, suggesting that there
could be a role for motivational factors in the explanation of anosognosia. As I mentioned in Section 1.2, anosognosia has
negative effects, as people who do not acknowledge the illness or impairment may be slow in seeking treatment and
unmotivated to engage in rehabilitation. But after the initial stages of illness, anosognosia is associated with fewer negative
emotions and reduced anxiety.
2.2. Delusions as a shear pin
According to the ‘‘shear-pin’’ account developed by McKay and Dennett (2009), some false beliefs that help manage
negative emotions and avoid low self-esteem and depression can count as psychologically adaptive. McKay and Dennett
suggest that, in situations of extreme stress, motivational inﬂuences are allowed to intervene in the process of belief eval-
uation, causing a breakage. Although the breakage is bad news epistemically, as the result is that people come to believe what
they desire to be true and not what they have evidence for, it is not an evolutionary ‘‘mistake’’, rather it is designed to avoid
breakages that would have worse consequences for the person’s self-esteem and wellbeing.
What might count as a doxastic analogue of shear pin breakage? We envision doxastic shear pins as components of belief
evaluation machinery that are ‘‘designed’’ to break in situations of extreme psychological stress (analogous to the
mechanical overload that breaks a shear pin or the power surge that blows a fuse). Perhaps the normal function (both
normatively and statistically construed) of such components would be to constrain the inﬂuence of motivational
processes on belief formation. Breakage of such components, therefore, might permit the formation and maintenance
of comforting misbeliefs – beliefs that would ordinarily be rejected as ungrounded, but that would facilitate the
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that would thus be adaptive in such extraordinary circumstances.
[McKay & Dennett, 2009, p. 501]
Could motivated delusions be adaptive misbeliefs? The mechanism that inhibits motivational inﬂuences on belief evalu-
ation would be compromised, and as a result of this motivated delusions would emerge, making negative emotions easier to
manage and depression less likely to ensue. McKay and Dennett consider the possibility that some delusions count as adap-
tive misbeliefs, but interestingly argue that the extent to which desires are allowed to inﬂuence belief formation in the case of
delusions is pathological. Delusions are the result of the maladaptive version of a psychologically adaptive mechanism.
Delusions may be produced by extreme versions of systems that have evolved in accordance with error management
principles, that is, evolved so as to exploit recurrent cost asymmetries. As extreme versions, however, there is every
chance that such systems manage errors in a maladaptive fashion.
[McKay & Dennett, 2009, p. 502]
More needs to be said about the precise nature of the advantage that adaptive misbeliefs may have, but shear-pin
accounts are helpful in providing a framework for the potential psychological beneﬁts of motivated delusions. First, in the
shear-pin account, the situation in which adaptive misbeliefs emerge is already seriously compromised. The premise is that
the person is already experiencing high levels of distress, and can come to more serious harm unless her negative emotions
are managed. Thus, the beneﬁt here amounts to the prevention of more serious harm than the one the person is already
experiencing. In other words, the adaptive misbelief is equivalent to an emergency response. McKay and Dennett talk about
the ‘‘extraordinary circumstances’’ in which motivational inﬂuences on belief are not just tolerated but desirable, and argue
that such inﬂuences are not accidental but designed. I am going to suggest that a careful consideration of the circumstances
in which beliefs are adopted should play a role in establishing not just whether they have psychological beneﬁts, but also
what their epistemic status is.
Second, the phrase ‘‘adaptive misbelief’’ and the general description of the shear-pin mechanism may be taken to
suggest that there is almost an inverse correlation between psychological and epistemic beneﬁts. The more distant the
belief is from a bleak reality, the more psychologically adaptive it is. This is not, however, what McKay and Dennett have
in mind. Indeed, a possible explanation for the difference between motivated delusions and non-delusional adaptive
misbeliefs is that delusions are ultimately maladaptive because, in the case of delusions, motivational inﬂuences affect
beliefs to an extent that compromises their overall plausibility and makes them impervious to counterevidence. These epi-
stemic costs are likely to bring also psychological costs, and thus delusions may turn out to have greater psychological
costs than beneﬁts. I am going to suggest that we should resist a trade-off view of the relationship between psychological
and epistemic beneﬁts. There are reasons to believe that it is psychologically beneﬁcial to have beliefs that are constrained
by reality, and that managing negative emotions, relieving anxiety, and protecting self-esteem have epistemically positive
consequences.
3. Epistemic innocence
What is it to be epistemically innocent? Innocence is sometimes cashed out in terms of a person being ‘free from faults’ or
‘free from sins’. This is not the sense of innocence I am advocating here. Ideally, agents would have beliefs that are true and
that are supported by, and responsive to, the evidence available to them. But human agents have limited cognitive capacities,
and beliefs that are false and badly supported by, or irresponsive to, the evidence are a common occurrence. It is tempting to
dismiss epistemically costly cognitions altogether. But sometimes an epistemically costly cognition can also have positive
epistemic features. When these epistemic beneﬁts are signiﬁcant and could not be attained in other ways, then the cognition
may gain some sort of innocence.
The notion of innocence I have in mind is used in the legal context of justiﬁcation defence. In general, an innocence defence
applies to someone who is not deemed liable for an act that appears to be wrongful. Innocence defence can be due to excuse
or justiﬁcation. An excuse defence applies when there is no criminal intent. A justiﬁcation defence applies when the act does
not constitute an offence in the given circumstances because it prevents greater harm from occurring. Here is an example of
a justiﬁcation defence: Ann injures Ben and by doing so she stops him from detonating a bomb (Greenawalt, 1986, p. 89). It is
morally and legally objectionable to cause injury to another, but in the speciﬁc circumstances in which Ann injures Ben her
action has some signiﬁcant beneﬁts as it prevents a greater harm from happening. Moreover, other ways of stopping Ben,
such as talking him out of detonating the bomb, may be not available at the time. Ann is acquitted because what she did
is not wrongful: it is an acceptable response to an emergency.
My purpose here is to apply this notion of innocence to the domain of epistemic evaluation. In some contexts, an
epistemically costly cognition (say, a false belief) may help avoid bad epistemic consequences, and thus qualiﬁes as an
acceptable response to an emergency.1 For instance, a delusion is epistemically innocent if adopting it delivers a signiﬁcant
epistemic beneﬁt that could not be obtained otherwise.1 In the analogy I draw between innocent acts and innocent cognitions it does not matter whether the act or the cognition counts as voluntary as here I focus
on the consequences of the acts and not the intentions of the agent.
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Epistemic Beneﬁt: The delusional belief confers a signiﬁcant epistemic beneﬁt to an agent at the time of its adoption.
No Alternatives: Other beliefs that would confer the same beneﬁt are not available to that agent at that time.2
The exact formulation of the conditions for epistemic innocence will vary depending on one’s epistemological commit-
ments. Let us consider the Epistemic Beneﬁt condition ﬁrst. The epistemic beneﬁts of having a cognition may include
maximising the acquisition and retention of true beliefs (for a veritist), promoting intellectual virtues (for a virtue epistemol-
ogist), or avoiding epistemic blame (for a deontologist). In line with a broadly consequentialist understanding of epistemic
value, I shall argue in Section 3.1 that the adoption of a delusional belief can support the agent’s epistemic functionality that
would otherwise be compromised by overwhelming negative emotions and low self-esteem. I take epistemic functionality to
be the capacity to perform well epistemically by acquiring true beliefs/knowledge or exercising intellectual virtues.
Now let us consider the No Alternatives condition. Different notions and degrees of unavailability can explain the failure
to adopt a less epistemically costly cognition. This variety may be due to the nature of the limitations that the agent experiences
in the relevant context, ranging from standard reasoning limitations to deﬁcits affecting perception, inference, or memory in
clinical settings (see Sullivan-Bissett (2015) for a useful taxonomy of relevant types of unavailability). In short, there may be
no alternative to adopting a delusional belief because evidence that would lend support to less epistemically costly beliefs is
not available or cannot be weighed up due to a bias or deﬁcit. I shall review these options in Section 3.2.
3.1. Meeting the Epistemic Beneﬁt condition
The epistemic beneﬁts of motivated delusions are mediated by their psychological beneﬁts. We saw in Section 2 that the
adoption of a delusional belief can be psychologically adaptive. In the shear-pin account of the beneﬁts of delusions, the very
fact that people believe a more positive version of reality (e.g., ‘‘I am now severely disabled, but my girlfriend still loves me’’)
than the one they have evidence for allows them to manage negative feelings that could become overwhelming, preserve
self-esteem, and overcome anxiety and stress. The beneﬁts in question amount to the delusion preventing a serious episte-
mic harm from occurring.
McKay and Dennett focus on the effects of adaptive misbeliefs on wellbeing. The point of allowing motivational factors to
inﬂuence belief evaluation is to make the person feel better about herself and her situation. But if a belief helps manage neg-
ative emotions, protect self-esteem, and relieve anxiety and stress, it will have positive effects not just on the agent’swellbeing
but also on her capacity to function well epistemically (what I called ‘‘epistemic functionality’’). By having the belief, a person
will be more likely to engage with her surrounding physical and social environment in a way that is conducive to epistemic
achievements. Consequences of stress and anxiety include lack of concentration, irritability, social isolation, and emotional
disturbances. These in turn negatively affect socialisation, making interaction with other people less frequent and less condu-
cive to useful feedback on existing beliefs, and to the fruitful exchange of relevant information. Due to reduced socialisation
and engagement, the acquisition and retention of knowledge is compromised and intellectual virtues are not exercised.
There is at least one problemwith considering relief from stress and anxiety as an indirect source of epistemic advantages
for motivated delusions. The delusion may bring relief at the time when it is adopted, due to the person being already in an
epistemically compromised situation, but it often increases rather than reduces stress and anxiety when it is maintained in
the face of conﬂicting evidence and challenges from third parties. Stress and anxiety no longer come from the negative emo-
tions associated with trauma or loss (‘‘I’m paralysed’’, ‘‘My girlfriend left me’’, ‘‘Nobody loves me’’, etc.), but from the fact that
the content of the delusion can clash with aspects of the person’s experience, conﬂict with other things she believes or feels,
and alienate other people. For all of these reasons, anxiety and depression do not always lessen after a delusion is adopted,
they can also heighten. This is particularly true of delusions with negative content that are correlated with higher depression
and lower self-esteem (e.g., Smith et al., 2006). Thus, the adoption of a delusional belief may be beneﬁcial because it prevents
the occurrence of a disastrous epistemic breakdown, but its beneﬁts are unlikely to outlive the prevention of the breakdown.
It should also be kept in mind that acknowledging that motivated delusions can have some epistemic beneﬁts is not equiv-
alent to claiming that their epistemic beneﬁts outweigh their epistemic costs. My claim is relatively modest: when they are
adopted delusions can be epistemically innocent, as opposed to epistemically justiﬁed, or epistemically good overall.
The obvious question is why the person does not adopt a belief that has the same epistemic beneﬁts as the delusional one
but fewer costs. One suggestion emerging from the empirical literature is that, in the ‘‘extraordinary circumstances’’ in which
the agent ﬁnds herself, no other belief with the relevant characteristics is available.
3.2. Meeting the No Alternatives condition
I have reviewed some of the literature suggesting that motivated delusions can help manage negative emotions and avoid
low self-esteem because they function as a defence mechanism against the psychological effects of previous adversities or2 I consider only beliefs or belief-like states as relevant alternatives here as I am interested in the epistemic evaluation of delusions, that is, how they fare as
beliefs or belief-like states. I leave it open that the beneﬁt the delusion confers at the time of its adoption could be gained by other means.
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epistemic functionality, then motivated delusions can be thought of as epistemically beneﬁcial in the circumstances. This
claim, though, does not amount to an epistemic defence of motivated delusions. In order for delusions to be epistemically
innocent, we also need to establish that less epistemically costly beliefs could not deliver the same epistemic beneﬁts. This
is analogous to the legal case: for Ann to be found innocent of injuring Ben, the court needs to be convinced that there was no
other way for her to stop him from detonating the bomb.
How to characterise the availability of alternative beliefs is an issue which deserves greater attention than I can give it
here. To make a start, I shall review how the unavailability of alternative beliefs has been assessed with respect to delusions
emerging in the context of anosognosia. There are two main obstacles to adopting a non-delusional belief (such as ‘‘I am
paralysed’’): (1) evidence for the truth of the non-delusional belief is not available; and (2) evidence for the truth of the
non-delusional belief is available but the agent’s capacity for evaluating competing hypotheses is compromised, and thus
the evidence is not taken into account.
To start with option (1), is evidence for their impairment available to people with anosognosia who deny their impair-
ment? The possibility that people may be covertly aware of their impairments has been discussed widely in the empirical
and philosophical literature (see, for instance, Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd, & Kopelman, 2010; Levy, 2008).
Ramachandran (1995) found that people with anosognosia for left hemiplegia who are asked to choose between unimanual
tasks (tasks that they can perform by using just one hand) and bimanual tasks (tasks that they can perform only if they use
both hands) consistently choose bimanual ones because the expected rewards are greater. Controls (people with paralysis
but no anosognosia) choose the unimanual tasks instead. This seems to suggest that people with anosognosia genuinely
believe that they can succeed in those tasks. Given these results, there is no reason to suppose that evidence of their impair-
ment is available to them.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the use of a virtual reality box, where the person is fooled into seeing her
(paralysed) arm moving by following the experimenter’s instructions (in reality, the moving arm belongs to someone else).
If people were aware of their paralysis, they would show (verbal and non-verbal) signs of surprise, but this is not the case.
[F]ar from being a mere façade-like condition that leaves room for traces of insight to leek through, anosognosia runs
deep.
[Ramachandran, 1995, p. 31]
With respect to option (2), some cases of anosognosia show that the person can be made temporarily aware of her impair-
ment (via vestibular stimulation), but lacks the capacity to integrate the information in her overall conception of herself
(Ramachandran, 1995, p. 36). As we saw earlier, Ramachandran explains the formation of the delusions in terms of the need
to preserve a coherent sense of self. Usually, the left hemisphere produces confabulatory explanations aimed at preserving
the status quo, but the right hemisphere detects an anomaly between the hypotheses generated by the left hemisphere and
reality. So, it forces a revision of the belief system. In people with anosognosia, this discrepancy detector in the right
hemisphere no longer works, and the belief system fails to update.
For Aimola Davies and Davies (2009), it is both true that the person has no direct evidence of the impairment and that she
cannot use the other available evidence to revise her belief that she is healthy. Indeed, the formation of anosognosia is
explained by the authors in terms of two factors: (1) the person’s motoric failure does not make itself known to the person
via direct experience due to neglect, loss of proprioception, or speciﬁc problems of integration and memory; and (2) the per-
son cannot use other available evidence of motoric failure due to problems with working memory and executive function.
This analysis strongly suggests that evidence for the belief that there is an impairment is not usually available to people with
anosognosia: they cannot learn about their impairment from their own experience (due to a neuropsychological deﬁcit that
constitutes factor one), and they cannot use other evidence to come to the conclusion that they are impaired (due to their
compromised capacity to evaluate competing hypotheses that constitutes factor two).
Even if evidence for non-delusional beliefs were available to people with anosognosia, such beliefs would probably fail to
support the agent’s epistemic functionality to the same extent as the delusional beliefs. A more plausible belief (e.g., ‘‘I am
paralysed’’) may not be as well placed as the delusional one to play a defensive function, in terms of preserving a coherent
and positive self and defusing the negative emotions caused by trauma and disability. Given that the non-delusional beliefs
lack such psychological beneﬁts, they may also lack the epistemic beneﬁts associated with them.
4. Conclusions and implications
In this paper I have argued that the psychological beneﬁts of motivated delusions can convert into epistemic ones.
Motivated delusions have the potential for epistemic innocence, where epistemic innocence is characterised as the epistemic
status of those cognitions that have obvious epistemic costs but also have a signiﬁcant epistemic beneﬁt that would be
otherwise unattainable. Those delusions that allow the agent to manage negative emotions and avoid low self-esteem are
also likely to support the agent’s epistemic functionality. Moreover, when they are adopted, motivated delusions may be
the only beliefs supporting epistemic functionality that are available to agents distressed by the consequences of previous
adversities, recent trauma or loss.
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positive illusions, confabulatory narratives, and distorted memories, we usually think in terms of there being a trade-off.
Believing something false or putting a positive spin on a past event can make us feel better, but it leads us further away from
the truth. Thus, it may increase wellbeing, but it is not epistemically good. The case for the potential epistemic innocence of
motivated delusions puts some pressure on the trade-off view. It would be misleading to believe that motivated delusions
provide anxiety-relief and protect self-esteem by compromising access to the truth. Rather, in the picture I have sketched,
delusional beliefs are adopted at a time when access to the truth is already compromised by the effects of trauma or previous
adversities, and it would be further compromised unless negative emotions were effectively managed. As a temporary
response to an emergency, motivated delusions play a useful epistemic function.
These considerations obviously apply to other epistemically costly cognitions. In particular, everyday self-deception and
motivated delusions seems to have a very similar shear-pin function in that they are the result of a mechanism that lets
desires shape beliefs. In so far as motivational inﬂuences on belief formation relieve anxiety and stress, everyday self-
deception and motivated delusions can carry some beneﬁts by supporting the agent’s epistemic functionality. But different
from self-deception, motivated delusions may invite a radical embellishment of the agent’s reality and create tension both
within an agent’s belief system and between the agent and other agents, thereby causing inconsistencies, social isolation,
and withdrawal. Thus motivated delusions are more likely to become maladaptive (as opposed to adaptive) instances of
misbelief than everyday self-deception. On the other hand, the person with everyday self-deception may have more alter-
native hypotheses available to her than the person who ends up endorsing a motivated delusion, if we suppose the former
is not subject to perceptual abnormalities or reasoning impairments to the same extent as the latter. Thus, it may be harder
to argue for the epistemic innocence of non-clinical self-deception.
The case of motivated delusions and its analogies and disanalogies with self-deception illustrate perfectly the limitations
of the trade-off view: some of the psychological beneﬁts attributed to delusions carry signiﬁcant epistemic beneﬁts that it
would be unwise to neglect. It may seem that wellbeing is safeguarded at the expense of truth when the delusional belief is
adopted, but a reﬂection on the effects of adopting the delusion suggests that safeguarding wellbeing and promoting
epistemic functionality go hand in hand.
In the case of Reverse Othello syndrome described earlier, the clinical team decided not to challenge the delusion after
they realised that there were no other psychotic symptoms and the delusion was playing a defensive function.
Persistent attempts [. . .] to challenge B.X.’s delusional beliefs were unsuccessful and usually led him to become tearful
and agitated.
[Butler, 2000, p. 87]
It was concluded that B.X.’s fantasy system functioned to protect him from the consequences of massive narcissistic
injury and attendant depressive overwhelm. All members of the treating team were instructed not to aggressively
B.X.’s delusional beliefs but were also cautioned not to become complicit in his elaboration of them.
[Butler, 2000, p. 88]
Similarly, Fotopoulou observes that challenging delusions in a person with anosognosia can prove ineffective and
psychologically disruptive:
[RM’s] engagement in rehabilitation activities was initially very poor as he was not motivated and required constant
prompting and supervision. Attempts to contradict his anosognosia and increase his motivation were often ineffective
as RM immediately provided a series of confabulations to support his alleged abilities and he was particularly sensitive
to poor performance and negative feedback.
[Fotopoulou, 2008, p. 554]
The excerpts above make a similar point in different contexts (Reverse Othello syndrome and anosognosia): if the
delusional belief provides some psychological beneﬁt and the beneﬁt is not available via any other belief that the person
would accept at that time, then challenging the delusion is a bad idea. A clinical team might decide not to challenge a
delusion if they think that challenging an agent is going to be ineffective or disruptive, or if there is a high risk of depression
ensuing from the agent’s insight into her mental illness.
My discussion suggests that, in these contexts, challenging the delusion might not be advisable from an epistemic point of
view either. At the critical stage, motivated delusions may serve a useful epistemic function, allowing the agent to overcome
negative feelings or low self-esteem that would prevent her from exercising her epistemic functionality.
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